Security Clearances Are "Not a Marketing Tool"

Executive Summary

The Australian Government has issued a comprehensive policy directive addressing what it describes as a significant national security vulnerability: the public disclosure of security clearance information on professional networking sites and online platforms.

Policy Advisory 002-2025, released by the Department of Home Affairs under the Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF), takes an unequivocal stance on the matter, stating that "Security clearances are a privilege, not a marketing tool."

The Threat Landscape

The advisory opens with a sobering assessment of Australia's security environment:

This directness reflects growing concerns within Australia's intelligence community about sophisticated foreign targeting of cleared personnel. According to the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), foreign intelligence services have increasingly turned to social media and professional networking platforms to identify, assess, and approach potential targets.

Security clearances afford personnel privileged access to Australian Government security classified information and resources. Disclosure of security clearance and national security information makes personnel, their colleagues, and their organisations vulnerable to targeting by foreign powers and their proxies.

What the Policy Requires

The new directive mandates that all entities sponsoring security clearances must implement three key principles:

The SOUP Reporting Framework

The advisory's introduction of the SOUP reporting framework provides clearance holders with a practical tool for assessing whether contact or approaches warrant reporting. This represents a shift from vague guidance to report "anything suspicious" to specific, memorable criteria.

• Suspicious: Contact that raises red flags or seems out of the ordinary
• Ongoing: Repeated contact attempts or sustained engagement
• Unusual: Behaviour that deviates from normal professional interactions
• Persistent: Contact that continues despite disengagement attempts

Security professionals note that the "Ongoing" and "Persistent" elements are particularly important, as foreign intelligence cultivation often occurs over extended periods, with seemingly innocuous initial contacts gradually becoming more targeted.

Reporting Channels

If personnel believe they have experienced contact with a foreign power, they should contact their Agency Security Adviser, Post Security Adviser or equivalent security personnel for advice, or use one of the following channels:

• Phone: 1800 123 400
• SMS: 0498 562 549
• Email: hotline@nationalsecurity.gov.au

Reports made to the NSH can be made anonymously and are passed to the appropriate law enforcement and security agencies for consideration.

• Portal: Notifiable Incidents, Threats, or Reportable Observations (NITRO) portal
• Phone: 13 ASIO (within Australia)

The LinkedIn Problem

Whilst the advisory doesn't explicitly name platforms, the timing and content clearly address the widespread practice of Australian defence and government contractors listing their security clearances on LinkedIn profiles. Industry sources suggest thousands of Australian professionals currently display "NV1 Cleared," "NV2 Clearance," or "Top Secret Cleared" badges on their public profiles.

This practice, common in recruitment circles where clearances are seen as valuable employability credentials, has created what security experts describe as a "targeting catalogue" for foreign intelligence services.

International Context

United States

The United States has long discouraged public disclosure of security clearances, with the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) explicitly stating that clearance information should not be shared on social media or professional networking sites.

United Kingdom

The UK's National Protective Security Authority similarly advises against advertising security vetting status, though enforcement varies across departments.

What Sets Australia Apart

Industry Implications

The policy has significant implications for Australia's defence and security sector, where clearances have become a de facto currency in recruitment. Recruiters frequently advertise roles requiring "active NV1" or "current NV2," and candidates have traditionally responded by prominently displaying their clearance status.

Industry representatives suggest this may require a fundamental shift in recruitment practices, with verification of clearances potentially moving to later stages of the hiring process rather than being part of initial screening.

What Happens Next

The policy advisory is accompanied by Policy Explanatory Note 004-2025, which provides additional implementation guidance. This document is available to Australian Government personnel through the Department of Home Affairs.

Entity Requirements

Entities sponsoring clearances are expected to:

• Review and update existing policies within reasonable timeframes
• Conduct training sessions for all cleared personnel
• Establish clear reporting procedures aligned with the SOUP framework
• Monitor compliance whilst respecting privacy considerations

Individual Action Required

Understanding Foreign Intelligence Tradecraft

The policy advisory provides clear examples of how foreign powers operate when targeting Australian clearance holders. Understanding these methods is essential for recognising and reporting suspicious approaches.

Common Cover Identities

Foreign intelligence officers frequently pose as legitimate professionals to build trust and access. Common cover identities include:

• Consultants offering lucrative business opportunities or partnership proposals
• Recruiters headhunting for positions with unusually attractive compensation packages
• Government officials from foreign embassies or trade commissions
• Academics or researchers seeking collaboration on studies or policy papers

Cultivation Tactics

Foreign powers employ sophisticated psychological manipulation techniques designed to exploit human vulnerabilities:

Common cultivation approaches include:

• Offers of speaking fees, honoraria, or consulting arrangements far exceeding market rates
• Paid travel to conferences or events in foreign countries
• Requests for "informal discussions" about Australian policies or developments
• Appeals to ethnic, cultural, or ideological affinities
• Exploitation of financial pressures or personal circumstances

Clearance Holder Responsibilities Under the New Policy

The policy creates specific ongoing obligations for all Australian Government security clearance holders, regardless of clearance level.

Mandatory Online Presence Review

Clearance holders must immediately audit their online profiles across all platforms, including but not limited to:

• LinkedIn and other professional networking sites
• Personal websites and online portfolios
• Social media profiles (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.)
• Professional association directories
• Alumni networks and university profiles

What Must Be Removed

• Specific clearance level held (Baseline, NV1, NV2, PV)
• Date of clearance grant or expiry
• Any reference to "security cleared" or similar terminology
• Access to specific classified systems or information types
• Details of security vetting assessments or processes

What Remains Permissible

The policy recognises legitimate professional needs and permits disclosure of:

• Current employer or organisation name
• General location (city and state)
• General area of work or professional expertise
• Publicly available information about role or responsibilities

Implications for Defence Industry Recruitment

The prohibition on clearance disclosure creates significant operational challenges for Australia's defence and security sector, which has developed recruitment practices heavily dependent on clearance status visibility.

Current Recruitment Model

The traditional defence industry recruitment model operates on clearance transparency:

• Job advertisements explicitly state clearance requirements ("Must hold active NV1")
• Candidates prominently display clearance status to signal eligibility
• Recruiters filter candidates based on visible clearance credentials
• Clearance verification occurs early in screening to avoid wasted effort

Required Adaptation

Industry representatives suggest the sector will need to fundamentally restructure recruitment processes:

Economic Impact Concerns

Industry stakeholders have raised concerns about:

• Increased recruitment costs and timeframes
• Difficulty identifying cleared candidates in competitive markets
• Potential loss of cleared personnel to international opportunities
• Administrative burden of confidential clearance verification

However, government officials have made clear that national security considerations take absolute precedence over recruitment efficiency.

Comparison with Allied Nations' Approaches

United States

The US approach to clearance disclosure has long been restrictive, though enforcement varies. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) explicitly advises against social media disclosure, stating that such information "makes you a more attractive target for foreign intelligence services."

However, US defence contractors routinely advertise clearance requirements, and candidates commonly include clearance status in applications and resumes for government contract work. The key difference is that this information is shared privately in application materials rather than publicly on social media.

United Kingdom

The UK's National Protective Security Authority provides guidance discouraging vetting status disclosure but leaves implementation largely to individual departments. British defence sector recruitment operates similarly to Australia's traditional model, with clearances visible on professional profiles.

The UK's approach reflects a different threat assessment and risk tolerance, though recent concerns about Chinese intelligence activities have prompted policy review.

Canada and New Zealand

Both Five Eyes partners maintain advisory rather than mandatory policies on clearance disclosure. Canadian federal employees are discouraged from advertising security status but face no formal prohibition. New Zealand's approach similarly relies on education rather than enforcement.

Australia's Distinctive Approach

Australia's integration of clearance disclosure prohibition into the mandatory PSPF represents the strictest approach among Five Eyes partners. This reflects:

• Australia's unique geographic proximity to competing strategic powers
• Recent high-profile foreign interference incidents
• Growing intelligence assessment of active targeting campaigns
• Political consensus on hardline foreign interference countermeasures

A Broader Strategic Message

Beyond the immediate policy requirements, Advisory 002-2025 reflects Australia's increasingly hardline approach to foreign interference and espionage. The blunt language - "If they can, they will. And they are" - signals that Australian authorities view the threat as active and ongoing rather than theoretical.

This aligns with recent years' heightened focus on foreign interference, including:

• The establishment of the Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator position within the Department of Home Affairs
• Expanded powers for ASIO to investigate and disrupt foreign intelligence activities
• Increased public awareness campaigns about foreign interference risks

Conclusion

Policy Advisory 002-2025 represents a clear escalation in how Australia addresses the intersection of professional networking, recruitment practices, and national security. By formally prohibiting the online disclosure of clearance information whilst acknowledging legitimate professional needs, the government has attempted to strike a balance between security imperatives and practical realities.

For the estimated tens of thousands of Australians holding security clearances, the message is unambiguous: your clearance is valuable to Australia's adversaries, and advertising that you hold one makes you, your colleagues, and your organisation vulnerable to targeting.

As foreign intelligence tradecraft increasingly exploits digital platforms and professional networks, this policy advisory may be the first of many adjustments required to protect Australia's classified information in an era where the boundaries between professional networking and intelligence targeting have become dangerously blurred.

Important Resources

Website: protectivesecurity.gov.au

Access the complete Protective Security Policy Framework and related guidance

Email: PSPF@homeaffairs.gov.au

Australian Government personnel can request Policy Explanatory Note 004-2025

National Security Hotline: 1800 123 400

ASIO: 13 ASIO

Report SOUP: Suspicious, Ongoing, Unusual, or Persistent contact